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The Endemic and Systemic Malaise of Mainstream Economics1
Ben Fine
1 Introduction
The poverty of mainstream, orthodox, neo-classical economics, I will use the terms
interchangeably, in the wake of the crisis has become something of a cliché. As argued
elsewhere, in the entirely different context of ethics, economics has become shown to be
“unfit for purpose”, Fine (2013), and has even been accepted as such by its own
practitioners. A striking if far from uncommon illustration of this is revealed by the work of
Oliver Blanchard, erstwhile Chief Economist at the IMF. In the abstract of Blanchard (2008),
a working paper with presumably relatively limited delay to publication, he suggests,
emphasis added:2
For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked
like a battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts do not go away, a largely
shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology has emerged. Not everything is
fine. Like all revolutions, this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge,
and suffers from extremism and herding. None of this deadly however (sic). The state
of macro is good.
Just a short time later, Blanchard had entirely changed his tune, having in the interim
joined the IMF, Blanchard et al (2010). Effectively five “confessions” were made of the mea
culpa variety, in explaining how the state of macro was no longer good, that: low inflation
should be a primary target of policy; this could be achieved through the single instrument
of the interest rate; fiscal policy was of limited significance; financial regulation was not a
macroeconomic matter; and, with the Great Moderation, continued stability was more or
less guaranteed.
No  doubt  this  commendable  turnaround  was  prompted  by  the  Great  Financial  Crisis,  the
GFC, something that had been presumed to have been rendered extinct, as if a Black Swan
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event. However, turnaround as such is insufficient. It remains to be shown why
macroeconomics should not only have become so complacent but to have done so on the
basis of a set of propositions that can only be considered to be narrow and ill-conceived
even in the absence of the prod to reconsider them in light of the GFC. In other words, it is
not simply a matter of confessing to being foolish, not as an individual but as a profession,
but also to understand how such foolishness could come about and what can be done to
remedy it and make sure it does not happen again.
This  is  the  purpose  of  this  paper.  But  it  also  covers  wider  terrain.  For,  first,  whilst  in
particular, the poverty of macroeconomics has been exposed by the GFC, this can itself be
misleading in revealing the discipline’s weaknesses, and the reasons for them, through an
undue focus on how finance as such has been handled as it understandably focused
attention. Indeed, it will be argued that such deficiencies as are revealed and exposed by
Blanchard in this way are merely the tip of the iceberg in terms of what are considerably
larger and deeper inadequacies in mainstream economics and, of course, not just
macroeconomics. Second, this will also shed light on why the response of the mainstream
to the crisis has in practice been extremely limited, with little prospect for major change in
either teaching or research.3 Third, this is in part the consequence and reflection of the
marginalisation of alternatives to the mainstream, of pluralist or heterodox economics, that
is both systematic and continuing.
This  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  It  charts  how  mainstream  got  to  be  how  it  is  across
three sections, beginning with the passage from the marginalist to the formalist revolution
in Section 2. This is then followed in Section 3 by an account of the evolution of mainstream
economics after the second world that ultimately witnessed the subordination of
macroeconomics to an extremely reduced microeconomics at the time of the GFC (even if
not as extreme as the New Classical Economics that preceded and influenced it). Section 4,
through reference to economics imperialism, accounts for how the mainstream has
incorporated material from outside of its traditional analysis and has widened its scope of
application. This has not, however, given rise to a genuine interdisciplinarity and has served
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more to veil rather than to address the reduced substance of the mainstream, whilst
further consolidating its command of the discipline at the expense of alternative
approaches. In this light, the final section suggests the prospects for the transformation of
mainstream economics as a discipline are extremely bleak (although heterodox economics
and political economy is prospering outside it), unless major external pressures are
exerted upon it to change.
2 From Marginalist to Formalist Revolution
It is uncontroversial that over the past forty years, macroeconomics has become
increasingly wedded to microeconomics. It warrants charting how this has come about over
a longer period, going back at least to the marginalist revolution of the 1870s. This set in
train a focus upon the optimising behaviour of individuals, whether in supply (basing itself
on cost or production functions) or demand (utility functions in practice although amenable
to more general formulation in terms of fixed, well-behaved preference orderings).
In  this  light,  the  passage  from  the  marginalist  revolution  to  what  has  been  termed  the
“formalist revolution” of the 1950s was marked by a particular technical problem – given
utility and production functions and optimising individuals, what are the maximal
restrictions that can be placed on the functional forms taken by supply and demand curves
(whether for theoretical or empirical purposes in estimation). Ultimately, this issue was
resolved through the Slutsky-Hicks-Samuelson conditions. However, for my purposes, this
is of lesser significance than the process by which the results were obtained and on which
they depend. I have described this as an “implosion”, as the casting of the problem was
systematically reduced in ways that allowed it to be solved, throwing out whatever
qualifications  might  be  necessary  and,  it  might  be  argued,  losing  sight  of  the  original
motivation of seeking to explain the determinants of supply and demand even if posed at
the level of the individual agent.
Essentially, this implosion involved two processes. The first was in setting the problem for
which it became essential to assume that utility is given and fixed, that its maximisation is
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the sole motive, and that goods are essentially defined by their physical properties and have
no social content as such or in forming and fulfilling the subjectivities of consumers.4
Similarly, for production, technology itself is given and conceived of as merely a (narrowly
conceived technical) relationship between inputs and outputs. Such starting points
necessarily preclude many of the issues that not only determine supply and demand but
also what constitute their very nature. On the other hand, and second, even taking this
implosion as starting point, merely allowing for optimisation to be achieved required
further technical assumptions to be made, such as diminishing returns.
In short, the goal of establishing supply and demand curves, and of basing them on utility
and production functions, became part and parcel of a method in which modelling assumed
a  high  priority.  At  the  time,  and  in  retrospect,  this  has  been  described  and  justified  as
representing the deductive method and, falsely, seen as resembling the methods of the
natural sciences. But a critical point of departure from the latter is the lack of basing
assumptions on empirical observation, or some form of realism. Admittedly, individuals do
(as well as do not) pursue self-interest but it is apparent that the reliance upon utility and
production functions and individual optimisation (to be termed the mainstream’s technical
apparatus) is more or less arbitrary other than in pushing forward a solution to the problem
posed on its own terms as opposed to those of the functioning individual let alone economy.
In some respects, then, the development of microeconomics in these terms might be
thought of as not only an original sin, reflected in the implosive disregard for other factors
and  methods,  but  the  transformation  of  that  sin  into  virtue  as  far  as  the  mainstream  is
concerned. This is also characteristic of the other great issue arising out of the passage
from the marginalist to the formalist revolution, the development of general equilibrium
theory. This, setting what will be termed the mainstream’s technical architecture, 5
unquestioningly aggregated over individuals subject to the technical apparatus, to discover
a given set of prices at which supply and demand will  be equal to one another across all
markets simultaneously. Again, without going into details, general equilibrium theory was
propelled by the problem it was seeking to solve, discarding any obstacles in the way of
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seeking out the existence, uniqueness, stability and (Pareto) efficiency of such an
equilibrium, consolidating the ethos of sin/virtue around the methods and assumptions
involved. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that de jure, general equilibrium theory is
conducive to rejecting its own relevance for understanding the economy given the thicket of
assumptions and presumptions underpinning its construction. But de facto, these
reservations are not only set aside in assuming, often implicitly, that general equilibrium
does or could prevail, but also that the approach and assumptions attached to it are
sacrosanct  –  not,  it  should  be added,  in  the  sense that  they  are  always all  made but  that
they are open to be adopted or not at the discretion of the discipline according to purpose
and convenience, a point taken up later in the context of “suspension”.
3 From Formalist Revolution to GFC
This is, however, to anticipate (the consequences of) the burgeoning influence of
microeconomics. Crucially, though, over the period of the establishment of the technical
apparatus and technical architecture, or TA2, especially in the 1930s, its presence and
influence within the discipline was subordinate to other approaches. Most obviously, in
retrospect, is the rise of (Keynesian) macroeconomics as its complement, slightly later but
no less rapid and influential, together with what would now be thought of as heterodox
economics, especially old institutional economics and the more general traditions of
inductive economics, each of which dovetailed with study the of the history of economic
thought as well as economic history and contemporary social and economic developments.
This rendered monopolisation, corporate behaviour and organisation, labour relations,
business cycles, distribution of income, and so on, subject to close attention.
In this respect, coming out of the second world war, there were three broad fields within
the discipline – macroeconomics, microeconomics and a mixed bag of applied fields which
was soon to incorporate development. Each flourished over the post-war boom. Whilst
macroeconomics was captured by the so-called Keynesian neo-classical synthesis, IS/LM,
it became heavily influenced by the formalist ethos attached to microeconomics, not least
in being reduced to modelling quite apart from expunging the more radical elements of
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Keynesianism attached to the nature of the financial system (reduced to the liquidity trap by
the  synthesis  as  a  special  case  of  failure  of  Walrasian  adjustment)  and  the  role  of
uncertainty (reduced to risk). Nonetheless, the IS/LM framework in principle and in
practice retained a distance from microeconomics, with some sort of commitment to
systemic analysis, primarily through close attention to the determinants of macroeconomic
aggregates and how they interact (consumption, investment, demand for money functions,
etc). Applied fields tended to forge their own independent paths according to their subject
matter but, of crucial significance, they did so in parallel with the core division between
microeconomics and macroeconomics (one notable exception being the more or less
vacuous field of welfare economics, deriving from Graaff (1957), and its telling contrast with
public economics as was).
The evolving relations between the latter have, however, increasingly involved the
subordination of macroeconomics to microeconomics, surreptitiously to some degree
during the post-war boom but deliberately and precipitously in its wake.6 This convergence
of microeconomics upon macroeconomics inevitably involved a corresponding convergence
not only upon general equilibrium but also upon select elements of its associated TA2.
Here, though, it is important to disentangle two different aspects of general equilibrium.
One is the reliance upon optimising individualism, and hence methodological individualism
of  a  special  type.  In  general,  and  in  its  full  application,  this  had  to  wait  upon  the  New
Classical Economics, after which it continued to hold sway, even in new Keynesianism’s
breach with this extreme form of monetarism and reduction to microeconomics (see
below).
The other aspect of general equilibrium is reliance upon Walras’ Law - each (intended)
supply must be matched by an (intended) demand and so the aggregate of all supplies and
demands must sum to zero.7
This is important in underpinning Patinkin’s rejection of the classical dichotomy, itself an
immediate consequence of the search to find compatibility between microeconomics and
macroeconomics. What Patinkin showed is, first, that the classical dichotomy could not
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hold alongside Walras Law and, effectively, lack of money illusion across whatever
agencies (not necessarily individuals) determine supply and demand. For, with separate
real and monetary economies, a hypothetical doubling of prices to explore the
consequences for supply and demand would yield no change. Presuming, for convenience,
that all goods markets are in equilibrium, they would remain so. But, with a fixed supply of
money, and a positive (presumably proportionate) increase in demand for money to
undertake whatever real transactions are intended, there would be excess demand for
money, violating Walras’ Law.
Patinkin draws the conclusion that the classical dichotomy must be rejected and, by the
same token, money matters to the real economy. Equally, the homogeneity postulate is
also rejected unless taken to hold over prices and money. This all leads to the real balance
effect appearing in the real economy but with neutrality of money being restored in the long
run. An increase in money does not change the equilibrium in real terms, it only changes
the price level and the (unspecified) path to that unchanged equilibrium.
There is a point of running over these well-known results, generally if not universally
incorporated into macroeconomics, and necessarily so where this aspect of general
equilibrium is respected. It  is that it  is indicative across a number of dimensions of steps
taken in macroeconomics that laid the foundation for the impoverished state of
macroeconomics even if not directly responsible for it.
First is the dependence of macroeconomics upon an unchanged, unique, presumably
efficient (or someone might do something about it), long-run equilibrium around which
macroeconomics came to focus in terms of paths of adjustment. Second, then, and more
broadly is draw a firewall between short and long runs, conflating the different ways of
understanding these as if they were all the same: namely, in equilibrium or not; the
passage of time; and the relative speed of adjustment of variables (itself subject to
theoretical and empirical dispute, not least between Keynesians and monetarists over
quantity and price adjustment). Only through this conflation was it possible both to allow for
short-run adjustment without long-run effects (for a recession, for example, surely reduces
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the levels of investment upon which the equilibrium rests). Third is the facile treatment of
money as both fixed, or fixable, in supply,  but also subject to equilibrium with demand as
opposed  to  being  part  and  parcel  of  a  financial  system  that  is  more  or  less  effective  in
mobilising and allocating resources for investment. 8  Last, Patinkin’s contribution is
indicative of what could be done, and how, to join micro and macro consistently together
within the mainstream but, if only implicitly and subsequently overlooked, other aspects of
the dualism between micro and macro, major preoccupations of applied economics and
interwar institutional economics, were simply disregarded because they could not be
addressed. This includes monopolisation, labour relations, technical change, and business
cycles as part and parcel of the growth process (for example, there is no way that
Schumpeter’s creative destruction could fit across the macro/micro divide).
Indicative of these developments is the rise of mainstream growth theory, not least through
the Solow growth model of 1956. It represents the separation of growth theory from
macroeconomics. And it continues to remain unclear whether growth theory is a part of
macroeconomics or microeconomics in part because it is the technical apparatus of
microeconomics, specifically the production function, which has underpinned what is
essentially a macroeconomic issue, the long-term performance of the economy. And, of
course, the theoretical and empirical traumas associated with such growth theory in the
wake of the Cambridge Capital Controversies are simply set aside in the continuing
commitment to the associated technical apparatus despite its lack of consistency and
coherence even on its own terms.
In short, the relations across microeconomics, macroeconomics and other more applied
fields were certainly not fixed nor without flaws but they did constitute a compromise
around responsibility for subject matter even if with fluid boundaries. This compromise was
rudely shattered by the demise of the post-war boom, the credibility of Keynesianism and
the monetarist counter-revolution, spearheaded by Friedman and taken to extremes by
New Classical Economics, NCE. Whilst Friedman’s vertical Phillips Curve both placed
(adaptive) expectations at the heart of macroeconomics and reduced them to risk at the
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expense of uncertainty, the NCE denied even the minimal role that Friedman allowed the
state, to affect unemployment albeit at the expense of an ever accelerating/decelerating
price level.
The state ineffectiveness result (as well as the Lucas critique) involves the culmination of
the convergences previously identified, not least the presumption that there are some
(dogmatically privileged) irreducible fundamentals such as resources, preferences and
technologies from which all else derives,9 and  their  location  within  an  extreme  set  of
assumptions, and hence, consequences, not least representative individuals, perfectly
working markets, rational expectations and state ineffectiveness. Notable for the latter, in
particular,  is  that  it  follows  less  from  the  nature  of  the  theory  itself  (although  this  is
essential) than from the way in which the state is itself conceptualised. In a world in which
there is a given long-run equilibrium, representative individuals with given utility and
production functions, where there is no health, education, welfare or industrial policy, no
conflict  over  the  distribution  of  income,  and  so  on,  the  state  is  reduced  to  at  most  an
individual with some special powers to shift supply and demand. It is hardly surprising
given the powers of individuals in conditions of perfectly working markets that such a
reduced state should be powerless in face of Ricardian equivalence-type results. The state
is only enabled to do what individuals can and do neutralise.
Effectively, the NCE reduced macroeconomics to the consequences of monetary shocks. It
was soon complemented by real business cycle, RBC, theory in which fluctuations in the
economy are perceived to be the consequence of shocks in the rate of productivity increase,
relieving the analysis of the need to consider monetary factors altogether. NCE and RBC
theory were complemented by the efficient market hypothesis, EMH, for financial markets
to form a troika around which not only should state intervention be minimised but in which
the free operation of financial markets could also provide for the best of all possible
worlds.10
The troika, as critical point of departure, provided the basis for the new Keynesianism or
New Consensus Macroeconomics, NCM, leading to Blanchard’s assessment that the state
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of macro is good. But the NCM accepts as much, if not more, of the NCE than it rejects. It
retains rational expectations, representative individuals and micro-foundations. Where it
departs is in merely allowing for some markets to be inefficient in the limited sense of not
clearing instantaneously. The result is that government policy can be effective in a limited
way through interest rate manipulation, reflating or deflating the economy by decreasing or
increasing it. This does, however, build inflationary inertia into the system, and higher
interest rates will be needed to reduce inflation, inflationary expectations and expectations
(or credibility) of government policy. Whilst it has been argued that this unduly neglects the
role  of  fiscal  policy,  this  is  not  a  matter  of  choice  but  of  the  logic  of  the  model  since any
fiscal expansion will be neutralised by countervailing private reduction in expenditure
(Ricardian equivalence still holds in the “long run”) as a consequence of the model being
tied to a given long-run equilibrium and rational expectations.
This more or less completes our review of how did it get there as far as macroeconomics
on the cusp of the crisis is concerned. It has been subject to a division between
macroeconomics and microeconomics (with a correspondingly separate terrain for an
increasingly marginalised applied economics as it became reduced to microeconomics), a
reduction of microeconomics to TA2, the separation of short and long runs, a subordination
and eventual reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics, the driving of such
macroeconomics to extremes of rational expectations, perfectly working markets and
representative individuals, thereby reducing both the conceptualisation and the
effectiveness of the state, and at most the mildest of reactions against these extremes to
give rise to the NCM.
Crucially, the current world of mainstream economics is a far cry from that which prevailed
in the post-war boom even though there are many elements of continuity. This is so much
so that even those who played some considerable role in this evolution seem aghast at
what has been (or they have in part) created. For Solow:11
Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and announces to me
that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to do with him is to get involved
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in a technical discussion on cavalry tactics at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m
getting tacitly drawn into the game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte.
Even Milton Friedman lost patience with the developments in economics that he had done
so much to spawn, bemoaning the discipline had become “an arcane branch of
mathematics”.12
Usually omitted from the oft-quoted Solow is how he continues from above:
Now, Bob Lucas and Tom Sargent like nothing better than to get drawn into technical
discussions, because then you have tacitly gone along with their fundamental
assumptions; your attention is attracted away from the basic weakness of the whole
story. Since I find that fundamental framework ludicrous, I respond by treating it as
ludicrouc  –  that  is,  by  laughing  at  it  –  so  as  not  to  fall  into  the  trap  of  taking  it
seriously and passing on to matters of technique.
This is significant in drawing a distinction between what is and what is not ludicrous with
the presumption that Solow himself is well within the correct side of the border. This
reflects his dependence upon a wider set of less extreme principles applied on a much
narrower scope of analysis. He is, for example, extremely hostile to new growth theory in
minor part because of its false representation of old growth theory as predicting
convergence which it did not.13 For, in major part, Solow does not consider that the old
growth theory was intended to explain productivity change within, let alone between,
countries as it depended upon country-specific non-economic variables that had been
excluded from the analysis (which, after all, only drew upon weighted combinations of
inputs to measure technical change as a residual from warranted output increases). Yet,
Solow’s reduction of growth within a country to the microeconomic, technical apparatus of
a single production function might itself be considered ludicrous (and invalid, as
demonstrated by the Cambridge Critique).
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4 Economics Imperialism
Such a digression on the relationship between old and new growth theory raises the more
general issue of the scope as well as of the content of economic analysis. For, so far, the
focus has been upon the way in which macroeconomics has been reduced by the processes
involved. Most obviously, and recognised as such, in the wake of the GFC, the reduction of
the analysis of money to supply and demand, mediated as a market by the rate of interest
and wedded to a greater or lesser extent to the EMH, represents the most impoverished
treatment of the financial system by confining it, however well conceptualised as such, to
the nether regions of microeconomics whilst the financial system in practice was busy
preparing itself for the most spectacular of macroeconomic displays.
In this respect, it is crucial to recognise that the problem with economics is not that it has
in some absolute sense excluded consideration of relevant factors and issues from its
scope of analysis. Far from it even if this is the case for its macroeconomic analysis as
covered in the passage to the NCM. Indeed, as a discipline, economics is now more far-
ranging than ever before in the scope of analysis and variables that it incorporates.
Accordingly, it is essential to understand how this is the case and yet that macroeconomics
can have been as it is.
The answer is to be found in the evolution of economics imperialism by which is meant the
increasing application of (an evolving) mainstream economics, primarily microeconomics,
to other social sciences. This essentially has its origins with the formalist revolution of the
1950s. For, having established the microeconomic principles attached to TA2, it was at least
implicitly recognised that they were subject to a tension that can be termed the historical
logic of economics imperialism. Initially, the microeconomic problem was posed as
addressing the implications of the optimising individual in a market context, to explain
supply and demand in response to prices leaving aside other motivations for individual
behaviour and social determinants. However, and this is the logic, once the problem was
solved and the methods established with credibility as a core part of the discipline, it
became apparent that the technical apparatus of utility and production functions is of
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universal application without confinement to the market and to supply and demand. This
pushed for wider applicability of the technical apparatus, with success contingent upon
disciplinary acceptability.
In what is termed the first phase of, or old, economics imperialism, especially associated
with  Gary  Becker,  the  principles  are  applied  outside  the  market  but  as  if  a  market  is
present. Prior to the demise of Keynesianism, this gave rise but was confined to three
notable successes – cliometrics (the new economic history), public choice theory (politics
as horse trading subject to costs and benefits) and human capital theory (education and
skills as if reduced to an investment good). However, with the monetarist counter-
revolution and the subordination of macroeconomics to microeconomics, economics
imperialism enjoyed greater leeway, not least engaging fields within economic itself, most
notably macroeconomics but also, for example, the new development economics (although
this was based on the old economics imperialism).
However, paradoxically, the greatest impetus to the second phase of, or new, economics
imperialism derived from a reaction against the analytical thrust of the first in its reliance
upon  perfectly  working  markets.  In  part,  this  was  motivated  by  the  wish  to  restore
Keynesianism through rejecting the instantaneous market clearing attached to the NCE. In
doing so, reliance was placed on explaining inefficient, sticky or absent markets through
microeconomic principles by setting aside perfect for asymmetric information on one or
other side of the acts of exchange, with Akerlof’s market for lemons the paradigmatic
exemplar.14 In this way, the non-market became amenable to analysis in the much more
palatable form (to economists and non-economists alike) as the response to market
imperfections as opposed to the reflection of market perfections.15 The result was to induce
a whole new range of fields extending economic analysis to the non-economic, or
revitalising those fields that had previously been subject to the old economics imperialism.
By the same token, most of the disparate fields, dubbed applied economics earlier, came
under the sway of microeconomics, with mathematical models and econometrics
displacing inductive methods and content.
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Six aspects of the second phase of economics imperialism are worth highlighting over and
above its scale and scope of subject matter and disciplinary coverage. First is that the
marriage of TA2 with concepts from the traditions, methods and theories of the other social
sciences is inevitably, despite being primarily on the terms of economics, conducive to
inconsistency if not inchorence. Generally, for example, enriched content in the motivation
underpinning individual behaviour raises questions over where each form of behaviour
begins and ends, and the use of social categories, such as gender, race or class begs the
question of how these are compatible with methodological individualism. In other words,
economics has now become subject to what can be termed “suspension”, prioritising its TA2
more or less unquestioningly but being prepared more or less arbitrarily to set it aside as
the determinant of behaviour in deference to other explanatory factors. Significantly, both
the confidence with TA2 and the timing of the inclination to complement it with other factors
is highlighted by the commentary of Herbert Simon (1999, p. 113) who suggests of the
1930s that he offered economics two gifts, “organizational identification” and “bounded
rationality”. He bemoans the fact that, “The gifts were not received with enthusiasm. Most
economists did not see their relevance to anything they were doing, and they mostly
ignored them and went on counting the angels on the heads of neoclassical pins”. Similarly,
despite being developed by mainstream economists soon after the second world war, game
theory was only heavily integrated into mainstream economics once its potential
(suspended) inconsistencies with individualism could be overlooked – the need, in light of
conjectural variation, to take a view of other players’ world views and vice-versa so that
preferences and actions are inevitably interdependent and certainly not conducive to single
equilibrium. In short, game theory and behavioural economics have attained a particularly
strong presence within the mainstream as they allow for an almost unlimited scope and are
conducive to policy analysis that is far more rounded than that relying upon TA2 alone.16
Second, such ill-considered promiscuity in the promotion and suspension of its own
economic principles has itself developed to such an extent that it can be considered a third
or newest phase of economics imperialism, one in which the basic principles have been
more or less discarded altogether leaving behind a shell of mathematical modelling and
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econometric estimation. This has, for example, led the leading exponent of critical realism,
Tony Lawson (2013), to argue that essentially there is no such thing as neoclassical
economics (in part by reference to how Veblen defined it which is hardly relevant to the
present day) and to characterise (the deficiencies of) the mainstream in terms of its being
reduced simply to reliance upon deterministic mathematical models in search of empirical
regularities (and corresponding social ontology). This is, however, to overlook that the
principles of the mainstream, organised around TA2, have been far from absolutely
suspended and continue to lie at the centre of and inform the vast majority of teaching and,
if less so given the novelty of suspensions, research within the discipline. In the event,
though, the character of the third phase of economics imperialism is well captured by the
terminology of freakonomics and the economics of almost everything.
Third, this latest phase of economics imperialism gives rise to an extraordinary extension
of scope but in ways which are fragmented and incoherent. There is simply a proliferation
of fields and analyses with little or no unifying frame of analysis, connecting them to one
another, other than (suspended) commitment to TA2 as well as contingent ideological
predilections in favour of the market (as has been the case for free trade, for example), or
otherwise  (as  for  minimum  wages).  With  a  starting  point  in  TA2,  and  the  determinants  of
supply and demand upon the market, economics has reached out to the world beyond these
in a big bang of filling out the rest of the universe. Such anarchy is reflected, for example, in
the simultaneous development of the new institutional economics and the application of
social capital within economics, each of which has separate intellectual origins, but each of
which performs the same function of accounting for the non-economic’s impact upon the
economy. Yet, these two literatures sit side-by-side with little or no interaction between
them, as in the work of Nobel Prize winner, Elinor Ostrom, Fine (2010a). And, in addition,
the social capital and rent-seeking literatures incorporate exactly the same analytical
frameworks whilst drawing entirely opposite conclusions concerning the impact of the non-
economic upon the economic, Fine (2010b). Much the same lack of unifying framing of the
discipline is characteristic of more insular economic analysis itself, in contrast for example
to the Keynesian/monetarism world visions (or, indeed, those of classical political
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economy). After all, we are primarily left with the vision that some markets work well and
some do not, which means that the same applies to macroeconomies.
Fourth, this is all indicative of what has been termed bringing back in, BBI. As outlined, the
TA2 was established by an implosion, the systematic exclusion of any factor, method,
realism or even narrow technical assumption that stood in its way. Economics
imperialism’s  big  bang  has  ultimately  seen  that  implosion  reversed,  with  TA2 exploding
within the discipline and across other disciplines. Although there tend to be no go areas,
most notably those social sciences in the wake of postmodernism engaging in the meaning
of economic and social activity, ethnography and so on (and especially, in this light, the
world of consumption within the other social sciences which is not reducible to fixed
utilities/identities and symbolic content of goods), BBI is quintessentially the
inconsistent/incoherent form taken by the suspended character of economics imperialism.
This is precisely and perversely because TA2 could only be established by precluding the
content which is now brought back in to be explained or to be used as explanatory variable
(thereby subsequently allowing for what essentially undermines the starting point).
Fifth, and more generally, this is indicative of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the
mainstream. The intellectual, institutionalised strengths lie in the unquestioned
commitment to TA2 even though it  is  subject  to  a  suspension that  might  have led  it  to  be
challenged in earlier times (through bounded rationality and/or game theory, for example,
that are now allowable). The weaknesses are twofold. On the one hand, it is accepted that
the discipline’s core principles are incapable of explaining the economy let alone broader
issues and, so, it is necessary to range beyond those principles to include an unspecified
and unspecifiable set of non-economic variables and analyses.17 On the other hand, the
corresponding explosion across the other social sciences to explain the economy let alone
the non-economic (as economics imperialism) exposes the discipline to alternative
methodologies, methods, theories and conceptualisations with which it is entirely
incompatible and both outdated and extreme, as is evidenced for example in its reliance
upon methodological individualism, empiricism, deductivism and so on.
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Sixth, at least intellectually, this explains the absolute intolerance of the mainstream not
only to alternative approaches but also to fields such as the history of economic thought
and the methodology of economics. So intellectually fragile is the mainstream to
alternatives that it can only prosper by marginalising and failing to engage with them other
than  on  its  own  narrow  terms,  if  bolstered  by  suspension  and  BBI.  Indeed,  this  is
rationalised by stigmatising heterodox economics for lacking the supposed scientific rigour
associated with the mainstream’s theoretical and empirical methods, even though these
border on the inconsistent and incoherent and are from the borders of the scientific
methods in the natural sciences that are putatively emulated.18
5 Prospects
The purpose of this wide-ranging overview of the discipline in a broader context is to
explain why the mainstream has proven incapable not so much to explain the GFC, and to
offer policy to move beyond it, but to be unable to respond to this lack of capacity itself. It is
not because of its lack of scope of analysis, given the pervasive reach of economics
imperialism, nor even, as most would suppose, the deadweight path dependence of what
was previously thought to be the good state of macro. Rather, the problem lies both in how
the discipline broaches broader material and in how this precludes moving forward to
alternative analyses other than in a marginal way. It is a consequence of suspended TA2 as
the content and form taken by the latest phase of economics imperialism. It is only able to
offer fragmented and inadequate analyses whilst offering the illusion of being capable of
including more or less anything at will.
This syndrome is ideally illustrated by reference to where the mainstream will not go, to
heterodox political economy.19 More specifically, especially in the wake of the GFC, the
notion of financialisation has over little more than a decade mushroomed across the social
sciences, incorporating an extremely wide range of disciplines, methodologies, methods,
theories, conceptualisations and subject matter, often from what is acknowledged to be
undue neglect of finance in the past. Particularly striking is the failure of mainstream
economics to have participated in this academic venture in any way whatsoever. Nor is it
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difficult  to  discern  why,  in  contrast  to  other  buzzword  and  fuzzword  concepts  such  as
globalisation and social capital, in which it has been able to participate from its own
perspectives. The obstacles to embracing financialisation are that it is systemic, involving
structures, relations, processes and agencies, and conflict and power. Both individually,
and especially collectively, these are anathema even to the most open and suspended
forms of economics imperialism – financialisation as behavioural economics, I don’t think
so!
But, equally important, as signalled earlier, even if sharply revealed by the GFC as the most
explicit form taken by its inadequacies, the nature of mainstream economics that renders it
incapable of addressing financialisation hangs heavily over the treatment of other issues
that it either neglects or impoverishes, whether it be technical change, distribution,
monopolisation, the role of health and education in economic performance, and so on. As
argued, it is not at all that these are not covered but that they are only so on the basis of a
piecemeal, fragmented and suspended TA2 which, paradoxically, continues to provide
considerable innovative momentum to the discipline and the marginalisation of alternatives
whether the latter be within heterodox political economy or through genuine
interdisciplinarity with the other social sciences.
This is truly a bleak picture and draws a sharp contrast with the previous major crises of
the 1930s and the 1970s, when Keynesianism and the monetarist counter-revolution
marked major changes in the discipline. By contrast, it seems today relatively undisturbed,
changing  rapidly  if  only  to  remain  the  same  given  the  shifting  forms  taken  by  the  latest
phase of economics imperialism. Indeed, in earlier work, Fourcade (2010) has suggested
that the scope for heterodox economics and its influence upon policymaking is highly
contingent upon country context. Somewhat later, however, she has felt obliged to tease
out what constitutes the supposed superiority of economists and how they sustain it,
Fourcade et al (2015). This has, however, strengthened and broadened over time, with one
of her exceptional cases, France, seemingly falling in line with the mainstream.20 The one
exception, that more than proves the rule, seems to be Greece where the Syriza
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Government is flush with professors of heterodox economics. Possibly, this signals that the
only secure way to bring about an alternative economics alongside, let alone in place of, the
mainstream is through an equally radical change in policies, itself contingent on
strengthening the political forces in favour of them.
1 This paper draws upon and adds to a number of earlier contributions where the themes
addressed are more fully developed and referenced, as well as participation in FESSUD
acknowledged in later contributions. See Fine and Milonakis (2009 and 2011), Milonakis
and Fine (2009), Fine (2015 and 2016a and b), Dimakou and Fine (2016). For the inertia of
the mainstream as “Zombieconomics”, see Fine (2009 and 2010d).
2 The paper was eventually first published online as a Review in Advance on May 12, 2009,
Blanchard (2009), and in print in September, 2009. The abstract was only amended to
correct as, “None of this is deadly however”, emphasis added. I have not checked for other
changes in the substantive content of the text itself.
3 For a sample of contributions on economics in the wake of the crisis, see Spaventa
(2009), Krugman (2009), Buiter (2009), Besley (2011) and Blanchard et al (eds) (2012).
4 Note this implies an entirely different individual subjectivity for mainstream economics (it is
fixed) than for the postmodernist inventive consumer.
5 The terms derive from Al-Jazaeri (2008).
6  As explicitly reflected by Lucas (1987, pp. 107-8), Nobel Prize winner and leading
proponent of the New Classical Economics, our emphasis, in the oft-quoted:
The most interesting recent developments in macroeconomic theory seem to me
describable as the reincorporation of aggregative problems such as inflation and the
business cycle within the general framework of “microeconomic” theory. If these
developments succeed, the term ‘macroeconomic’ will simply disappear from use
and the modifier “micro” will become superfluous.
7 To be distinguished from what might be termed Say’s Law that the same applies to goods
markets alone, which is refuted by Walras’ Law insofar as an excess supply of all goods (a
glut) can complement an excess demand for money, as is emphasised by Keynes in his
rejection of a stylised classical economics as flawed by adherence to Say’s Law with the
notable exception of Malthus.
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8 It is noteworthy that the mainstream is essentially incapable of explaining why money
emerges let alone why it would continue to be needed once equilibrium is attained.
9 For this as unquestioned common ground, in context of debate between NCE and NCM,
see Chari et al (2009).
10 Significantly, the EMH is primarily about capacity, or not, to make abnormal returns within
financial markets on the basis of available information; despite  its name, it says nothing
about the efficiency of the financial system in itself and for the economic system, and
cannot do so without making assumptions about the existence of a unique, stable, Pareto-
efficient equilibrium that is to be realised by the putatively efficient financial markets. See
Guerrien and Gun (2011).
11 Cited in Klamer (1984, p. 146).
12  This is exemplified by the fate of Harry Markowitz, who received a Nobel Prize in
economics in 1990 for his work on finance, but who completed his first work in the form of
his (successful) University of Chicago doctoral dissertation in 1955. As reported by Harrison
(1997, p. 176), citing Bernstein (1992), Friedman’s comment on Markowitz’s work was as
follows:
Harry, I don’t see anything wrong with the math here, but I have a problem. This isn’t a
dissertation in economics, and we can’t give you a Ph.D. in economics for a dissertation
that’s not economics. It’s not math, it’s not economics, it’s not even business
administration.
13 See Solow (2006) for example as well as contributions in critique of Lucas’ growth theory.
14 For the new economics imperialism as Kuhnian paradigm, see Fine (2004) and, in the
context of the newer development economics, Fine (2002).
15 Note also an alternative route for the new economics imperialism by allowing for market
imperfections in the presence of increasing returns to scale (and/or externalities). This is
especially associated with Paul Krugman (and new trade theory and new economic
geography) and new growth theory. For critical expositions, see Fine (2000, 2003 and
2006) and Fine (2010b), respectively
16 For a critique of “nudge”, now prominent in policy circles, in this vein, see Fine et al
(2015). And for a parallel path to that taken by bounded rationality in seeking to engage a
more realistic approach to consumption, now more readily acknowledged and
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accommodated, consider the work of George Katona and his contribution to behavioural
economics. See Hosseini (2011).
17 This is most apparent in new growth theory and Barro-type regresssions, see Fine (2000,
2003 and 2006).
18 Note, in particular, that deductive rigour (i.e. mathematical modelling) is always sacrificed
at the altar of analytical content - if the maths does not give what we want, too bad, as with
Cambridge Capital Theory, the conditions for the existence, uniqueness, stability and
efficiency of general equilibrium, the theory of the second best, etc.
19 This is not absolute as, of course, economics imperialism, especially in its latest phase,
also colonises heterodoxy with, for example, segmented labour markets as a leading
example of the application of asymmetric information economics, a topic that was
previously shunned by the mainstream, Fine (1998).
20 See http://assoeconomiepolitique.org/petition-pluralism-now/ See also Heise and Thieme
(2015) for the earlier history of the decline of German heterodox political economy if, to
some extent, falling into blaming the victim. See Lee (2012) for a more general defence of
heterodoxy against critics of its being responsible for its own fate.
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with the aim of developing a comprehensive policy agenda for changing the role of the
financial system to help achieve a future which is sustainable in environmental, social and
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partners from 14 countries that has unsurpassed experience of deploying diverse
perspectives both within economics and across disciplines inclusive of economics. The
programme is distinctively pluralistic, and aims to forge alliances across the social
sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve economic, social and
environmental needs. The central issues addressed are the ways in which the growth and
performance of economies in the last 30 years have been dependent on the characteristics
of the processes of financialisation; how has financialisation impacted on the achievement
of specific economic, social, and environmental objectives?; the nature of the relationship
between financialisation and the sustainability of the financial system, economic
development and the environment?; the lessons to be drawn from the crisis about the
nature and impacts of financialisation? ; what are the requisites of a financial system able
to support a process of sustainable development, broadly conceived?’
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